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Abstract: 
In this article, I evaluate the challenges related to the European Commission’s output gap method 
of calculating the structural budgetary position, and assess its bottom-up alternatives in the EU’s 
fiscal framework using the Finnish data for the years 1984-2014. The results reinforce the 
impression of the limited capacity of the output gap method to predict cyclical changes in real 
time and suggest that using the output gap method to steer fiscal policy tends to lead to a 
procyclical policy (stimulus in upturns and austerity in downturns). The bottom-up assessment 
methods that are based on discretionary fiscal policy measures appear to work better, and using 
them to steer the fiscal policy could make the policy more countercyclical. 
Keywords: structural budget balance, output gap, fiscal stance, discretionary fiscal effort 
JEL Classifications: E62, H60 
1. Introduction 
 
                                                     
1 This study has been funded from appropriations for assessment and research activities in support of the Government’s 
decision-making, and the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the European union under the grant agreement 
number 649261 (the Firstrun project). I would like to thank the following persons for their expert comments: Zsolt 
Darvas, Marketta Henriksson, Hannu Kaseva, Markku Kotilainen, Harri Kähkönen, Tuomo Mäki, Niku Määttänen, 
Veli-Arvo Tamminen,Jenni Pääkkönen,Tarmo Valkonen, Vesa Vihriälä and the seminar audience during internal 
seminars within ETLA, the Finnish Ministry of Finance, as well as the FIRSTRUN workshop and the joint EPC – 
ECFIN – JRC Workshop “Assessment of the real time reliability of different output gap calculation methods” in 2015. 
The author assumes sole responsibility for the contents of this paper and any errors therein. 
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The structural budget balance (SB) measures the budgetary position of public finances, when the 
effects of economic cycles and one-off expense and income items are eliminated.  It has received a 
central role in the EU’s fiscal policy legislation framework.  In the corrective arm of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, SB will help steer the removal of excessive deficit. In the preventive arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, it specifies the government’s general medium-term budgetary 
objective. In principle, the use of SB clarifies the execution of fiscal policy and its control. Public 
finances should react to shocks of a cyclical nature with automatic stability measures, and in 
principle, such measures should be allowed to work in spite of the short-term costs inflicted on 
public finances. However, if the SB worsens, the related change in fiscal policy can be interpreted 
as independent of economic cycles, and should be corrected at least in cases where the 
sustainability of the public finances is in danger. Without steering produced by fiscal policy 
indicators such as SB, uncertainty about the nature of shocks can easily lead to contradictory 
policy recommendations, which could, in the worst case, paralyse fiscal policy.2 
Despite its conceptual clarity, it is challenging to measure SB in practice. This is especially true of 
the so called output gap-based methods of measuring SB. The methods require assessments on 
several quantities that are difficult to measure (see for example Mourre et al. 2013; Havik et al. 
2014).  First, the output gap must be defined, i.e. the difference between actual economic activity 
and potential economic activity must be estimated. The structural budgetary balance is calculated 
next, taking account of the historical sensitivity of tax revenue and public expenditure to 
fluctuations in the output gap.  The resulting assessments of the effects of fiscal cycles on the 
budgetary position of public finances in different countries have been criticised as inadequate 
during the recent financial and debt crisis. If this is the case, fiscal policy reliant on such indicators 
is in danger of becoming procyclical.3 
In this article I assess the challenges in the European Commission’s method of calculating SB and 
consider methodological alternatives to the output gap method. The perspective adopted is that 
of recent Finnish economic developments between the years 1984-2014. The time period provides 
rapid swings in Finland's business cycles, from fiscal overheating in the late 1980s through deep 
crisis in the early 1990s to recovery and growth since the mid-1990s, the IT bubble in the early 
2000s, and finally the Great Recession in the late 2000s. The well-documented time period makes 
                                                     
2 While this paper focuses on the use of numerical rules to guide countercyclical policy-making (see, e.g, Portes and 
Wren-Lewis, 2015; Bergman and Hutchison, 2015, Sacchi and Salotti, 2015), that is, of course, only one factor that 
motivates their existence. A large literature on the governance of fiscal policy stresses the role of fiscal rules in 
curtailing political incentives to adopt policies likely to benefit the policy-makers rather than the interests of the 
economy (Begg, 2016). It encompasses issues such as the nature of the ‘contract’ between citizens as principals and 
their governments as their agents, the most appropriate design of institutions, and transparency (Besley 2007; 
Hallerberg et al. 2007; Begg 2014). The recent research finds evidence that sustainable public finances in Europe may 
be associated with strong fiscal rules, and that fiscal rules and government efficiency may be institutional substitutes in 
terms of promoting fiscal sustainability (Bergman et al. 2016). 
3 For example, Lane et al. (2012) argue that prior to the Eurozone crisis, financial policy was excessively based on 
output gap estimates, without taking into account the risks associated with external imbalances, credit expansion, debt 
overhang in various sectors and housing price trends. On the other hand, after the crisis broke out, concerns were 
expressed that the output gap-based assessment of the correction needed for SB had not produced the correct picture of 
adjustments made in the public finances (European Commission, 2013B).  
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it possible to examine in great detail both the functioning of European Commission’s method of 
calculating SB, as well as alternative indicators that might serve as inputs for tuning fiscal policy. 
With regard to the output gap method, I calculate historical estimates for two key components of 
the output gap (structural unemployment and the potential level of total factor productivity) in 
1984–2014. I also examine the plausibility of the Commission’s current estimates by comparing 
them to observations in earlier literature. In addition, I evaluate the method at various points in 
real time – that is without information on the future development of economy that would be 
available later. 
The results reinforce the impression of the limited capacity of the output gap method to predict 
cyclical changes in real time. Therefore, its use for steering fiscal policy - in the EU’s fiscal 
framework for instance – tends to lead to a procyclical fiscal policy (stimulus in upturns and 
austerity in downturns). For example, fiscal policy guided by an output gap-based SB does not 
react in a contractionary manner during the economic upswing in the 1980s and early 2000s. On 
the contrary, the indicator permits fiscal policy to be more expansive than the actual policy, if it 
had been calculated with real time data. Besides, an output gap-based SB indicator ignores the 
fairly strong contractionary measures in fiscal policy implemented in the crisis of the early 1990s, 
thereby leading to even more contractionary policy. 
Based on the results, it appears that the method currently used by the Commission may also be 
hypersensitive to changes in economic trends due to methodological reasons. In particular, 
estimates about structural unemployment in the recession of the 1990s that have increased to a 
quite high level indicate that the indicator could overreact to economic cycles. One explanation for 
the behaviour is provided by the statistically problematic constraints on the parameter estimates 
that are imposed when applying the estimation. 
As methodological alternatives to the output gap method, I will review other fiscal policy 
evaluation methods used in the EU’s legislation framework: the expenditure benchmark in the 
preventive part, and a bottom up assessment method in the corrective part of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. It is important to review alternative methods, since they measure the budgetary 
position using fairly different criteria. Unlike the SB, both the expenditure rule and the bottom up 
assessment evaluate potential production in the medium term. Cyclical expenditure items are 
subtracted from public expenditure more directly than in assessments based on an output gap and 
standard cyclical elasticity, and the revenue trend is measured based on the observed decisions on 
a revenue basis and assessments of their effects. 
In practice, alternative indicators already form part of the EU’s control of fiscal policy. An 
understanding of the practicality of the various methods is also necessary due to the fact that the 
EU rules on fiscal policy leave much room for selecting the indicator used to guide fiscal policy 
(although the output gap method still plays a fairly central role within the rules). In the preventive 
arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, the actualisation of the medium-term budgetary objective is 
assessed not only by output gap-based SB, but also by the expenditure rule. According to the 
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expenditure rule, public expenditure may only grow at the same rate as the potential medium-
term GDP used as the reference.  In the excessive deficit procedure of the corrective arm, the 
effectiveness of corrective measures is assessed not only via the SB, but also in terms of the 
number of discretionary measures in question. In practice, such an assessment is based on a 
method that resembles the expenditure rule very closely. Using this method, cyclical items are 
eliminated from the expenditure trend, which is then compared to the medium-term growth of 
potential production, taking account of changes in the revenue basis (bottom up assessment).  
For the analysis of alternative methods, I have collected a new historical time series on the effects 
of the changes on the revenue basis of the entire public economy (the state, local administration 
and social funds). Using the data, I analyse how the alternative methods would have worked over 
the last three decades. 
The results are encouraging. Using either the expenditure rule or the bottom up assessment to 
guide fiscal policy results in a more countercyclical policy than the output gap-based SB. Fiscal 
policy based on the expenditure rule is contractionary, especially during the lead up to the 1990s 
crisis, which could have helped to alleviate the crisis and increase the margin for recovery 
measures while it was taking place. On the other hand, based on a discretionary bottom up 
assessment, the contractionary fiscal policy practised from 1992 onwards is sufficient, and unlike 
the output gap-based SB, the method does not generate additional contractionary pressures. It is 
also noteworthy that in spite of their different assumptions, the methods provide a fairly uniform 
view of the magnitude of discretionary measures. 
In Section 2 of this article, I present the used methods. In Section 3, the applied data is introduced, 
while in Section 4 the results of the analysis are reported. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
 
In this section, I briefly present the output gap-based structural balance and its discretionary 
alternatives within the EU’s fiscal policy legislation framework.  
2.1. Structural balance with the Commission’s output gap method 
 
 
In the European Commission’s calculation method the structural balance (SB) is calculated on the 
basis of estimates about the historical sensitivity of tax revenue and public expenditure to 
fluctuations in the output gap. This is assessed as the difference between the actual fiscal position 
and the cyclic effects as relative to the GDP: 
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𝑆𝐵𝑡 =
𝑅𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡
𝑌𝑡
− 𝜖 ∗ 𝑂𝐺𝑡 − 𝑂𝑂𝑡 , 
 
where 𝑅𝑡 is public sector revenue, 𝐺𝑡 is public sector expenditure and 𝑌𝑡 is the nominal GDP at 
year t. The cyclic correction is the product of the output gap (𝑂𝐺𝑡) and the elasticity between the 
output gap and budgetary balance ϵ. In the method used by the Commission, the output gap is 
determined in proportion to the production potential of the entire national economy, and semi-
elasticity 𝜖 is assumed to be a constant. In addition, the budgetary balance is adjusted in 
proportion to GDP by using the effect of certain one-off revenue and expenditure items (𝑂𝑂𝑡). 
Mourre et al. (2013) reviews the semi-elasticity 𝜖 calculation method in more detail. 
Currently, most international institutions (OECD, IMF, European Commission) calculate potential 
output using the production function method, which enables the efficient utilisation of the 
available research information on production technology and the behaviour of various factors of 
production during the assessment of the cyclic phase of the economy. The idea is to aggregate a 
comprehensive view of the production capacity of the economy (potential production function), 
based on an economic theory and observations of the state of the various components.  
In the method applied by the European Commission (see Havik et al. 2014), the production 
function is assumed to follow the Cobb-Douglas form and it can be presented as  
  
𝑌𝑡 = (𝑈𝐿𝑡𝐿𝑡𝐸𝐿𝑡)
𝛼(𝑈𝐾𝑡𝐾𝑡𝐸𝐾𝑡)
1−𝛼 =  𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼 , 
 
where 𝑌𝑡 is total production, 𝐿𝑡 total labour input, and 𝐾𝑡  physical capital stock. The use of each 
production factor is controlled by their utilisation rate (𝑈𝐿𝑡, 𝑈𝐾𝑡) and the efficiency of use 
(𝐸𝐿𝑡, 𝐸𝐾𝑡). The parameter 𝛼 measures the expenditure share of labour input of all inputs. Labour 
input is measured as the total number of work hours, and capital is measured as the amount of 
capital services, divided into buildings and equipment. The Cobb-Douglas production function 
allows total factor productivity to be examined separately as the weighted product of efficiency 
and the utilisation rate. 
 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡 = (𝑈𝐿𝑡𝐸𝐿𝑡)
𝛼(𝑈𝐾𝑡𝐸𝐾𝑡)
1−𝛼 , 
 
The output gap can be divided into different components. When the potential magnitude of the 
components of the production function is known, the percentual deviation from potential can be 
approximately estimated as the difference between the logarithms of the components 
 
𝑂𝐺𝑡 = 𝐿𝑁(𝑌𝑡) − 𝐿𝑁(𝑌𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡) = 𝐿𝑁(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡) − 𝐿𝑁(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐿𝑁(𝐿𝑡) − 𝐿𝑁(𝐿𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡)). 
 
It is worth noting that, in the output gap calculation, the capital stock is not adjusted separately in 
line with the phase of the economic cycle. Moreover, the quantity of the potential workforce is 
divided further into several components. This corresponds to the potential workforce adjusted 
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based on the level of structural unemployment, 𝑁𝐴𝑊𝑅𝑈𝑡. The potential workforce is the product 
of the size of the population of working age people 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑊, the average level of participation 
𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡 and working hours per employee  𝐻𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡. 
 
𝐿𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡 = 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡
𝑊𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡(1 − 𝑁𝐴𝑊𝑅𝑈𝑡)𝐻𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡. 
 
The cyclical adjustment of participation and working hours is based on a statistical HP filter. Thus, 
the assessment of trends does not include a separate economic theory. The population of working 
age is measured based on the actual number of people of working age. 
Here, the focus is particularly on the methods of estimating structural unemployment and total 
factor productivity.4 With regard to distinguishing the cyclical and structural components of 
unemployment, the Commission uses a general labour market framework whose features are 
ultimately estimated based on the data and correspond to the predictions of various labour 
market theories (see Havik et al. 2014). Outside the long-term equilibrium, the short-term state of 
the labour market can be assessed using the Phillips curve. This curve describes the inverse 
relationship between inflation and cyclical unemployment. Key factors affecting the curve include 
assumptions about the creation of expectations. The total factor productivity term is also broken 
down into a cyclical and structural component, but unlike for unemployment, no precisely 
described theoretical model can be invoked to justify the breakdown. Instead, it is assumed that 
the cyclical term depends on the underutilisation of economic resources, which is measured using 
the capacity utilisation rate series and by making assumptions about the duration of the effects of 
the underlying shocks. 5 
2.2. Critique of the SB  
 
The measurement of output gap-based structural balance has been studied quite extensively in 
the literature, and an increasing number of reservations have been raised concerning its use. The 
estimation of the output gap is highly sensitive to changes in estimates over time, both due to 
genuine uncertainty and to the difficulty of selecting the right model (e.g. Orphanides and van 
Norden, 2002; Rünstler, 2002; Planas and Rossi, 2004; Golinelli, 2008; Marcellino and Musso, 
2010; Bouis et al., 2012).  
                                                     
4 The components play a central role in the output gap method and offer the greatest opportunities for a review from 
an economics point of view. 
5 Conclusions about unobservable structural changes in these components are made using the maximum likelihood 
method, a Bayesian method of calculation, and the Kalman filter. A more detailed description of the method is 
presented by Kuusi (2015), Planas and Rossi (2004), Planas and Rossi (2014) and Havik et al. (2014) 
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The uncertainties relates to various components of the output gap.6 First, it concerns the form of 
the production function. For example, in the Finnish case Jalava et al. (2006) state that the Cobb-
Douglas production function (whereby the nominal shares of the factors remain constant) may be 
statistically applicable in the long-term, but not completely adequate for describing Finland’s 
production since World War II. Luoma and Luoto (2010) are of the opinion that a more suitable 
production function would be the CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) production function, 
whereby the nominal proportions of production inputs may vary as their relative prices change.7 
Nevertheless, when applied during a crisis, the Cobb Douglas production function can be argued to 
provide a good estimate of the CES production function, even if the predictions generated by the 
Cobb Douglas production function would not work in the long term. (Havik et al., 2014). In any 
case, in the short run it is very difficult to assess technological development supporting various 
production factors and the change in respective input proportions. The effect of trends that are 
often weak but that affect the production function in the long term is dominated by the effect of a 
crisis on the profitability, efficiency and product demand of companies. 
The estimation of the individual components of the output gap also involves uncertainties. For 
example, with respect to the measurement of cyclical unemployment, the recent literature 
suggests that the behavior of inflation does not necessarily correspond to the New-Keynesian 
Phillips curve during major crises, even if it includes backward-looking elements, such as a lagged 
inflation term. For example, Stock and Watson (2010) are of the opinion that, in the US, an 
increase in unemployment does decrease inflation, but this effect wears off when a higher level of 
unemployment has lasted for 11 quarters. One of the underlying causes of this could be anchored 
inflation expectations, whose effects during the euro crisis are a topic of discussion, see for 
example Krugman (2013). Wage frictions (for example, pressure not to reduce nominal wages) can 
affect the relation between inflation and unemployment in such a way that it does not correspond 
to the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. (Daly and Hobijn, 2013). In the Finnish case, there is clear 
evidence of fairly substantial wage inelasticity in the crisis of the early 1990s (Gorodnichenko et 
al., 2012). 
Another key challenge is the estimation of the total-factor productivity (TFP) gap. The 
interpretation and forecasting of TFP growth can be problematic as it is measured as a residual 
growth of output after the influence of production factor growth is accounted for. Thus, TFP 
growth may result from multitude of factors, such as capacity utilization, increasing returns to 
scale, mark-ups due to imperfect competition, or gains from sectoral reallocations, as well as 
                                                     
6 While traditionally the output gap estimation has been based on the trend estimation, here the focus is on the 
production function based estimation of the output gap that most institutions currently use (OECD, IMF, European 
Commission). Murray (2014) reviews various trend estimation methods. 
7 A key question when selecting a production function is that of how technological development affecting production 
factors – capital and labour – changes the quantity of inputs adjusted for technological development, and their 
nominal proportion in production. Research on Finland indicates that, in the long-term, the proportions of the inputs 
change: the input proportion of the production factor that becomes cheaper (capital) reduces in proportion to the 
factor that becomes relatively more expensive, and on the other hand, technological development may support the 
growth of the amount of capital more than it raises efficiency in the utilisation of labour. 
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measurement errors of the inputs.8 Furthermore, TFP is subjected to major trend volatility that 
makes it difficult to assess its potential level. In this respect, Finland provides an illustrative 
example. In each major economic crisis of the last 30 years, the Finnish economy has suffered 
from structural surprise shocks that have persistently affected productivity (the Soviet trade 
collapse in the early 1990s and the recent collapse of the Nokia in the late 2000s). The shocks have 
been largely unanticipated and their aggregate productivity impacts have been hard to predict. 
The recent crisis shows that the uncertainty regarding the long-term productivity growth is not 
unique to Finland. 9  
 
All in all, a look on the Commission’s method in the present crisis confirms that revisions of the 
output gap have been large. For example, Virkola (2014) reviews the revisions made to the 
European Commission’s output gap methods, and reports that the changes to output gap 
estimates in 2000–2013 amounted to 1.5 percentage points on average during the crisis. 
Challenges associated with the calculation of the output gap-based SB are not, however, limited to 
the difficulty of measuring the output gap, but also relate to the difficulty of modelling the 
reactions of the public economy to cyclic shocks.  Firstly, a cycle-independent budget should not 
contain individual expenditure and revenue items that have no clear connection to the long-term 
balance. Although it is easy to eliminate one-off items from the budget in principle, problems 
occur when trying to define which items are temporary or large enough (European Commission 
2006). Secondly, the budget balance of the public finances can depend on fluctuations in asset and 
commodity prices that correlate only weakly with economic cycles (see for example Eschenbach 
and Schuknecht 2002, Price and Dang 2011). In addition, economic crises and their aftermaths are 
associated with structural and legal reforms that do not treat every sector and public finance 
revenue base equally. Taking them into account requires an alternative approach to SB calculation, 
since calculations based on an aggregated output gap assume that economic upswings and 
downswings are symmetrical and thus neutral towards sources of tax revenue (Kremer et al. 2006; 
Morris 2007; Wolswijk 2007; Barrios and Fargnoli 2010). 
2.3. The alternative indicators 
 
I evaluate alternative indicators that have recently been presented as solutions to the problems 
presented above within the EU’s fiscal policy legislation framework. These comprise the 
expenditure rule within the preventive arm of the SGP, which is defined in the Commission’s vade 
mecum guidelines (2013A, 2016). The purpose of the expenditure rule is to ensure that the 
                                                     
8 In this respect, one of the problem is the availability of good-quality data on capital that has historically been limited. 
(see, e.g, Bryson and Forth (2015) for the UK). While this paper abstracts from the problems regarding the 
measurement of the (productive) capital stock, a good reference is D’Auria et al. (2010) 
9 For example, before and during the Great Recession, the US real-time data obscured the slowdown in trend, and 
overstated productivity’s strength early in the recession. Almost every revision since 2005 has lowered the path of labor 
productivity (Fernald 2014). Similar patterns are widely seen in other countries (UK, Bryson and Forth 2015; Europe, 
Summers, 2014) 
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countries remain committed to their medium-term objectives (MTO) or a path of adjustments 
leading to it. On the other hand, the excessive deficit procedure in the SGP’s corrective arm 
assesses the outcomes of actions that seek to correct the budgetary position by means of a 
bottom up assessment. It resembles very closely the expenditure rule in the preventive arm in 
methodological terms.  The latter indicator is discussed by the European Commission (2013B) and 
Carnot and de Castro (2015), among others. 
The starting point in both alternative indicators is the direct analysis of detected policy changes 
instead of indirect assessments based on the output gap method. In principle, it is easy to monitor 
changes in economic policy on the revenue side: economic policy is essentially neutral if no new 
decisions are made. The combined effects of new decisions can be interpreted as a change in fiscal 
policy.   
On the other hand, there is no corresponding distinct neutral reference point on the expenditure 
side, as changes in the expenditures involve more automatic responses to the economic 
conditions, but the growth in expenditure must somehow be quantified in reference to other 
development in the aggregate economy. Changes in fiscal policy are measured based on the 
growth rate of aggregated expenditures, with various cyclical items being eliminate, as relative to 
the potential medium-term growth in GDP10. A fiscal policy can be interpreted as neutral if it will 
not change the expenditure proportion of GDP according to the adjusted expenditure in the 
medium term. On the other hand, if the adjusted expenditure growth rate exceeds the potential 
growth of GDP in the medium term, the fiscal policy must be interpreted to have changed, 
particularly if the difference will not be compensated with discretionary measures on the revenue 
side.  
In the following, I will examine alternative indicators in more detail. In the case of the expenditure 
rule, revenue base changes and various cyclical items are subtracted from public expenditure 
 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 − 𝐸𝑈𝑡 − (𝐼𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡
𝐴𝑉𝐸) − 𝑈𝐶𝑡  
 
                                                     
10 However, it must be noted that the Commission’s method of measuring potential production is also applied when 
making these longer-term assessments. This could still present a problem, especially since the output gap method 
includes an assumption on the closing of the output gap, which could also generate biased forecasts in the medium 
term (Timmermann 2006).  An alternative method of measuring potential production could, for example, lie in the 
long-term growth forecasting method used by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (Schackleton 2013; Hetemäki 
2015). In the case of Finland, on the other hand, shocks have often occurred at the sector level. Thus, it may be 
sensible to consider an alternative whereby the development of production is estimated from the sector level 
upwards, using growth accounting or sector-level growth models (Pohjola 2011; Kuusi 2013; Fernald 2014). 
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where in year t, 𝐺𝑡 is total public expenditure, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 interest expenses, 𝐸𝑈𝑡 the country's share of 
EU structural fund projects, 𝐼𝑡 public investment expenditure, 𝐼𝑡
𝐴𝑉𝐸 average public investment 
expenditure in the current and three previous years, and 𝑈𝐶𝑡 cycle-related variation in 
unemployment expenditure. Unemployment expenditures due to economic cycles are assessed 
based on an estimate of the magnitude of cyclical unemployment (derived from the magnitude of 
structural unemployment) and average unemployment expenses per unemployed person.   
The change in adjusted aggregated expenditures is calculated further, taking account of the 
discretionary change in revenue 𝑁𝑡
𝑅  (and certain expenses funded by earmarked revenue) in such 
a way that the proportional change in expenses is 
 
Δ𝐸𝑡
𝐸𝑡−1
=
𝐸𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡
𝑅 − 𝐸𝑡−1
𝐸𝑡−1
 
 
The growth rate of expenses is deflated using the price change in GDP. Using the method of 
calculating the expense rule, inflation is measured as the average of the Commission’s previous 
year's spring and autumn inflation forecasts for the current year. Let us express the real change as 
Δ𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑡−1
. 
The estimate of growth potential is based on the potential change in the level of production by the 
aggregate economy in the medium term. When the growth rate of expenditure equals the 
potential growth rate of production, the economy does not include a tendency to increase or 
decrease public demand in proportion to GDP in the medium term. Based on the Commission’s 
suggestion, the potential growth rate is defined as the average based on observations of the 
growth rate of potential GDP during the last five years and forecasts of the growth rate for four 
years into the future: 
 
 
Δ𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑡−1
= ((
𝑌𝑡+4
∗
𝑌𝑡−5
∗ ) − 1)
1
10
,  
 
where 𝑌𝑡
∗ is potential (real) production at a particular point of time 𝑡. 
When the adjusted expenditure aggregate has been calculated, its real growth 
Δ𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑡−1
  can be 
compared to the growth potential of the aggregate economy 
Δ𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡
𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑡−1
.. A useful result is that the 
growth of expenditure aggregate must undershoot the reference growth rate by 𝑥 ∗
1
𝐸𝑡/𝑌𝑡
 , to have 
the corresponding proportion of expenditure to GDP fall by x per cent, where 𝐸𝑡/𝑌𝑡 is the nominal 
GDP proportion of the expenditure variable used.  
In a bottom up estimate, the definition of the adjusted expenditure aggregate is slightly different 
to the expenditure benchmark. The expenditure aggregate is defined by first subtracting the non-
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discretionary unemployment expenditure (𝐺𝑡) interest expenses of public bodies (𝑈𝑡
𝑛𝑑) and one-
off expenditure items (𝐼𝑡) from the total expenditure of public bodies (𝑂𝑂𝑡): 
𝐸𝑡
𝐵𝑈 = 𝐺𝑡 − 𝑈𝑡
𝑛𝑑 − 𝐼𝑡 − 𝑂𝑂𝑡 . 
 
 
 
The change rate of expenditure is estimated as above  
 
Δ𝐸𝑡
𝐵𝑈
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐵𝑈 =
𝐸𝑡
𝐵𝑈 − 𝑁𝑡
𝑅 − 𝐸𝑡−1
𝐵𝑈
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐵𝑈 . 
 
The discretionary fiscal effort (𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑡) resulting from the nominal difference between the 
expenditure variable and reference growth indicates their impact on the change in the proportion 
of expenses in GDP between years t and t-1. I define DFE in the same way as the European 
Commission (2013B) and Carnot and de Castro (2015), as the difference between growth rates 
divided by the GDP ratio of the expenditure aggregate, as follows:    
 
  
𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑡 = −
Δ𝐸𝑡
𝐵𝑈
𝐸𝑡
𝐵𝑈 −
Δ𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝐸
𝐸𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡
𝐸𝑡
𝐵𝑈
= −
𝐸𝑡
𝐵𝑈 − 𝑁𝑡
𝑅 − 𝐸𝑡−1
𝐵𝑈
𝑌𝑡
+  
Δ𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝐸
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐵𝑈
𝑌𝑡
 
=
𝑁𝑡
𝑅
𝑌𝑡
−  
𝐸𝑡
𝐵𝑈 − 𝐸𝑡−1
𝐵𝑈 −
Δ𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝐸
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐵𝑈
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑅 + 𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝐸 ,
 
 
 
where the reference growth of potential production is now defined as nominal 
Δ𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡
𝐸
𝐸𝑡−1
=
(1 +
Δ𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑡
𝑒𝑡
𝑒𝑡−1
) ∗
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
− 1.. In the last breakdown, the indicator is further divided into the impact of 
revenue base changes (𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑅) and the change in expenditure related to potential (𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝐸).  
Subject to reservations due to the differences in the methods, both the DFE indicator and SB can 
measure the same cycle-independent change in the budgetary position. If the DFE indicator is 
positive by 1 percentage point, the growth rate of expenditure (with an adjusted expense 
aggregate and taking the revenue side into account), is estimated to be so slow that the budgetary 
position is strengthened on a discretionary basis by 1 percentage point.  
The theoretical connection between the output gap-based SB and the DFE indicator defined by 
aggregated expenditures used in a bottom up assessment has been reviewed by the European 
Commission (2013B, box III.2.1) and Carnot and de Castro (2015, Appendix 1).  In principle, the 
indicators are equivalent: During long-term growth equilibrium, where the elasticity of revenue 
and expenditure items are close to the averages estimated using the fixed elasticity method and 
economic growth remains stable, very similar results should be yielded by the different methods. 
However, differences may appear in the case of a large shock. Based on the breakdowns of the 
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two indicators, it becomes apparent that the differences on the revenue side are explained by 
changes in expenditure elasticity in cycles (such as windfall revenue), deviations in income class 
proportions from their fixed shares according to the fixed elasticity method, and changes 
generated by potential output in the long-term ratio of revenue and GDP. Of the above, changes in 
cyclical elasticities associated with windfall revenue are by far the most significant explanatory 
factor according to Carnot and de Castro (2015). On the expenditure side, the differences are 
mainly explained by unemployment expenditure that cannot be directly attributed to cycles, 
differences in methods of measuring potential output, or interest expenses. 
3. Data 
 
3.1. Data used in the evaluations of the output-gap method 
 
I mainly use the data from the European Commission´s autumn 2014 forecast as material. This 
comprises a time series on unemployment ranging from 1963 to 2016. The data between 2014 
and 2016 comprises forecasts. The inflation variable used in the Phillips curve is the change in unit 
labour costs. The unit labour cost is equal to wage inflation less the labour productivity growth 
rate and the change in consumer prices. The material extends up to 2014, while the data for 2014 
is the forecast by the Commission. 11 
In addition, the data consists of the total-factor productivity series which the Commission 
calculates using real GDP, capital and labour series, as well as their expenditure shares of the 
inputs in production. The figures for 2014 to 2016 are based on the Commission's forecasts. 
It also includes a capacity utilisation rate series, which is a collection of business cycle indicators 
describing economic activity (Havik et al., 2014). The series' components consist of the industrial 
capacity utilisation rate as well as service sector and construction sector confidence indicators. 
The indicators are weighted with the shares of total output of the economy attributable to 
different sectors, and their standard deviations are normalised in such a way that the deviations 
correspond to the standard deviation of the value added for the sector. Business cycle indicators 
are published quarterly, and the data for 2014 is based on the average of the first three quarters. 
When analysing the data used by the Commission, a point worth noting is that the capacity 
utilisation rate series only extends to 1996. The worst crisis years of the 1990s recession, for 
                                                     
11 The data from spring 2014 also provides a number of other explanatory variables, which I have use as auxiliary 
variables when assessing the Phillips curve. These consist of the change in terms of trade, which is estimated on the 
basis of the change in consumer prices and the GDP price ratio; the lagged change in terms of trade; the rate of change 
in labour productivity (GDP per number of workers); the acceleration of change in labour productivity; the lagged rate 
of change in labour productivity and the share of wages and salaries of GDP and its two lags. Their use, however, does 
not significantly affect the main results, and thus they are abstracted from the current paper (see, Kuusi, 2015, for 
further details.) 
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example, are therefore missing from the data. Therefore I also make use of another indicator 
series: estimates by industrial enterprises regarding their order books in relation to the norm, 
which I compiled by chaining indicator series BTEOLRSL and BTEOLL:B8S of the Confederation of 
Finnish Industries (EK). The data has been available since 1976; it thus includes data on the 1990s 
crisis. Further analysis provided by Kuusi (2015) suggests that the use of the alternative indicators 
yields very similar results. 
Finally, government budget balance series is taken from the AMECO database in the spring of 
2015. 
3.2. Data used in the evaluations of the alternative measures 
 
For a historical assessment of alternative indicators, I need information on revenue-related policy 
changes implemented in public finances (including central government, municipalities and social 
funds). With respect to central government finances, the data I have collected for this paper 
contains information on the estimated effects of changes in tax policy as provided by the Financial 
Status Reports 1977–2002. After the year 2002, the reports are no longer available in the same 
form. Therefore, I have evaluated the changes in the tax policy against the government's budget 
proposals for 2003–2008. With respect to the period 2009–2014, I received the necessary 
information from the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry's data also includes information on various 
types of deductions concerning the whole public sector. In addition to state taxation, I will 
examine the effects of policy changes made in general government finances. With respect to the 
period 2009–2014, I will use the evaluations of the Ministry of Finance. As for the preceding years, 
1977–2008, I could not find direct estimates of the effects of changes made to the criteria for 
charges on revenues, so I used the observed changes in charge percentages as the basis for the 
effect estimates of the decisions. 
I will evaluate local government finances' revenue estimates on the basis of changes in the 
weighted average local income tax rate and the real estate tax rate. I will calculate the euro-
denominated effect of the change by multiplying the change in the tax base with the tax basis of 
the previous year, which in the case of local income tax means private income and in the case of 
real estate tax the taxable value of real estate.  As for social insurance funds, I will evaluate the 
changes on the basis of the average social insurance contributions (employer's child benefit, 
accident, health, national pension, unemployment and TEL contributions and employee's 
unemployment and TEL contributions), expressed as percentages of the payroll. I will multiply the 
change in these with the previous year's total payroll. 
The number of discretionary measures on the revenue side in my calculations corresponds fairly 
well to previous assessments (for more details, see Kuusi 2015). Perotti (2011) assessed 
discretionary total changes on the revenue side with regard to Finland during the crisis of the 
1990s. The calculations that have now been completed reinforce the impression presented in the 
article that the revenue basis had a major impact on the overall balance of public finances during 
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the crisis. However, the results differ from the earlier evaluations by the IMF (see Perotti 2011), 
according to which public finances were not adjusted by increasing revenues but by cutting 
expenditure.  In addition, the Commission’s figures for 2010–2014 from the AMECO database 
(UDMGCR variable) are also parallel with the estimates used in this work.12 
In addition to the evaluation of changes in the revenue basis, I have collected other variables 
needed for the calculation of alternative discretionary measures. Potential output growth 
estimates for 2011–2014 are based on reference values provided by the Commission to the 
individual member states. Potential output growth estimates for 2002–2010 are based on the 
estimates made by the Commission in the autumn of the same year, by applying the production 
function method. Potential output growth estimates for 1989–2001 are based on the estimates 
made by the OECD at the end of the same year on average growth for the following two years and 
the preceding five years. With respect to the 1980s, I have estimated potential output growth on 
the basis of the average five-year growth forecast made by ETLA (the Research Institute of the 
Finnish Economy) in the same year. 
With respect to the expenditure benchmark, I will use the GDP inflation projections as inflation 
series. For the years 2001–2014, these are the European Commission's forecast averages from the 
previous year's spring and autumn. For the years prior to that, I will use the previous year's 
average inflation forecasts made by the Ministry of Finance. With respect to bottom-up 
evaluation, I will use the actual change in the GDP price. 
For the other variables, I have followed the principle of trying to find the longest time series 
possible in order to enable a historical assessment. As expenditure series, G, I have selected a time 
series, published by the IMF, for general government total expenditure because this covers the 
longest period from the early 1980s onwards.  In addition, I have used the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health's information on unemployment expenditure, which I will eliminate from the 
expenditure aggregate related to the bottom-up evaluation and, with respect to the expenditure 
benchmark, from the expenditure aggregate related to cyclical unemployment expenditure. As 
interest expenditure, I will use the time series given for property expenditure. The amount of 
public investment is based on the figures obtained from the National Accounts.13 
The data on Finland's shares of EU structural funds is based on the data for 2010–2014 obtained 
from the audit memorandum prepared by the National Audit Office of Finland regarding 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. Due to lack of preceding observations, I will set 
                                                     
 
 
13 In order to enable comparability between the results, I will also use the alternative variables which the Commission 
applies in its assessments. From the AMECO database, I have collected series for general government expenditure 
(UUTGE), interest expenditure (UYIGE) and investments (UIGGO). However, expenditure aggregates cannot be 
calculated on the basis of these for the years before 1999. 
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these to zero prior to the year 2010. Likewise, I will not assess the amount of non-recurring items 
since the related evaluations are not available for the entire period in question. In any case, since 
they have also been eliminated from the output gap-based structural balance indicator presented 
by the Commission, they are not essential for comparison purposes. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Evaluations of structural unemployment and total factor productivity  
 
In the following, I will first examine the method for calculating structural unemployment. The 
short-term state of the labour market can be assessed with the help of the New-Keynesian Phillips 
curve, which describes the inverse relationship between (wage) inflation and unemployment. In 
principle, the connection to structural unemployment is clear. If inflation reacts to an increase in 
cyclical unemployment, the detected connection can be reversed, and the increase in cyclical 
unemployment can be specified efficiently with the help of inflation. Thereafter, structural 
unemployment can be achieved by removing the cyclical part from detected unemployment. In 
practice, However, price stickiness in major economic crises due to anchored inflation 
expectations or pressures not to lower wages have turned out to be problematic with regard to 
the assessment of cyclical unemployment (IFAC 2013; Wren-Lewis 2013; Krugman 2013). If they 
are not sufficiently taken into account in the models – or if the models do not identify them 
correctly – the result may be oversized assessments regarding the development of structural 
unemployment. Based on changes in inflation, an increase in unemployment can be considered 
structural, although it would in fact be cyclical. The output gap will be underestimated, as the 
increase in structural unemployment does not increase the output gap. 
Explaining unemployment with the inflation indicator14 used by the Commission is also 
problematic in Finland’s case. There was no clear unambiguous connection between the variables, 
in particular during the crisis of the early 1990s (see the left panel in Figure 1). During the years of 
highest unemployment, strong inflation would have been required in order for such a connection 
to have been observed. This could not, however, be discerned on the basis of the data. The 
highest unemployment estimates were specifically for these years, based on the Commission’s 
method (see the right panel in Figure 1).  
In addition, special attention should be paid to the fact that the commission imposes inequality 
constraints on the parameter estimates when applying the estimation. In the Finnish case, the 
constraint restricts the maximum size of the cyclical change in unemployment forecasted by the 
model, insofar as the New-Keynesian Phillips curve does not directly explain it. Using the 
                                                     
14 The inflation variable is a change in unit labour cost that is equal to wage inflation less the labour productivity 
growth rate and the change in consumer prices. 
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restrictions could lead us to underestimate the amount of cyclical unemployment (See, Appendix 
for further details). I recommend that the parametrisation of the method used for calculating 
structural unemployment be changed to better correspond to a plausible model based on the 
literature and observations outside the model. When the constraint used in the parameter 
estimation is removed, structural unemployment increases more moderately during the crisis of 
the early 1990s (see the right panel in Figure 1).15 
 
Figure 1 Source: Data and algorithms from the European Commission´s autumn 2014 forecast, and author’s own calculations. 
I have also examined the European Commission's assessments of structural total factor 
productivity. Figure 2 shows the natural algorithm of structural total productivity and an 
assessment of potential total factor productivity with the Commission's calculation method for 
1980–2016. The dominant feature in the figure is the strong slowing of the total factor 
productivity growth rate after 2007. During the present crisis, the development of total factor 
productivity has been the main factor affecting potential output.  For example, compared to the 
recession in the 1990s, the halt in total factor productivity growth has lasted significantly longer. 
Total productivity reached 1989 levels only a couple of years after the start of the crisis, whereas 
during the current crisis, total factor productivity was still far from the 2007 level in 2014. 
While similar patterns are also seen elsewhere, reasons for the weak development of Finland’s 
total factor productivity during the economic crisis have been searched for, particularly in the 
                                                     
15 The development of Finland´s structural unemployment during the crisis of the 1990s has been assessed by Fregert 
and Pehkonen (2009), who also summarise the results of the previous literature. Their conclusion is consistent with 
the presented unconstrained model: the increase in structural unemployment would have been approximately 4 to 6 
per cent during the crisis, and would have begun to decrease very slowly during the recovery phase. 
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industry-level shocks that have hit the economy. It has been argued that the fall in total factor 
productivity is due to problems in the Nokia-driven ICT cluster and in the paper and mechanical 
engineering industries.  On the basis of productivity growth from sector to sector, and when 
Finland is compared to Sweden and the United States, it appears that the rather gloomy 
assessments about the development of total factor productivity that have been calculated using 
the Commission’s method are fair. When the development of the total factor productivity is 
examined in various periods of time in Finland, Sweden and the United States, for example, it 
becomes evident that the growth rate of total factor productivity has been on average very similar 
in the said countries in 1995–2014. Following the crisis, the strong growth effect of ICT prior to the 
economic crisis is stabilising in the Nordic countries to the same level with the United States.  
 
Figure 2 Data and algorithms from the European Commission´s autumn 2014 forecast, and author’s own calculations. 
4.2. Evaluations of the structural balance 
 
When the gap estimates for different components have been calculated, they can be aggregated 
as an output gap in the economy. Measuring the structural budget balance used by the 
Commission is fairly straightforward. The estimated output gap is multiplied by cyclical elasticity 
(𝜖) and income is subtracted from the headline balance. I use the estimate of 0.57 provided by the 
Ministry of Finance in the spring of 2015 as the cyclical elasticity. 
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Figure 3 shows alternative structural balance estimates as well as a series of non-adjusted balance 
retrieved from the AMECO database. I have first calculated an ex post evaluation of a cyclical 
correction (an ex post evaluation of cyclically-adjusted structural balance) using the method 
recommended in the report Kuusi (2015), that is, I based structural unemployment on an 
assessment in which the above-mentioned parameter constraint has not been used.16  In addition, 
I evaluated the operation of the indicator in (quasi) real time, without information on future 
development of the variables that are used in the estimation. I calculate the estimate after 
constraining the data being used at different points in time.17 I adjust the output gap estimate that 
I recommended, which does not contain parameter constraints, for key turning years in the 
economic cycle (1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2009) by changing the ex post estimate 
of total productivity and structural unemployment to real-time estimates (real-time cyclically-
adjusted balance). I will make the adjustment by removing the difference between the ex post 
estimate and real-time estimate of both components from the output gap. At the same time, I do 
not comment on the real-time cyclical adjustment of other output gap components, such as the 
participation rate. The GDP and nominal deficit estimates are also ex post. 
Real time has a considerable effect on the indicator's functioning. When estimates of total factor 
productivity and structural unemployment are based on data which takes no account of the trend 
for future years, the structural balance proves to be considerably more procyclical.18 In real time, 
the structural balance has deviated materially from the ex post estimate in two of the three 
expansions in recent decades (1989, 2000, 2007). The structural balance is overestimated by 
approximately 1.3 percentage points with respect to three business cycle peaks, on average. In 
addition, the real-time structural balance underestimated the deficit component due to the 
economic crisis when the downturn of the early 1990s had already begun. For example, the 1993 
ex post estimate of the structural contribution to the total deficit is approximately 35 per cent, 
while the real-time estimate would have been approximately 60 per cent.  
The results suggest that the output gap method has limited capacity to predict cyclical changes in 
real time, and therefore, its use for steering fiscal policy could lead to a procyclical fiscal policy. On 
the basis of the figure, it seems that fiscal policy guided by an output gap-based SB does not react 
                                                     
16 The suggested change in the calculation method of structural unemployment would have a positive effect of about 1 
percentage point on the structural balance during the crisis of the 1990s. During the present crisis, the effect is not quite 
as great. For example, a change in the calculation method of structural unemployment in 2016 would have a positive 
effect of approximately 0.02 percentage points on the structural balance. 
17 To be precise, a genuine real-time analysis would require the selection – as data – of the time series actually in use 
during the year under scrutiny. As regards the unemployment series, the data is not revised ex post. However, later data 
or methodological changes may have influenced the inflation series. In addition, the Commission uses estimates for the 
next two years when measuring the structural deficit. More details on the real-time behaviour of the individual 
components can be found in Kuusi (2015). 
18 However, when examining the recession at the beginning of the 1990s, it can be observed that ex post estimates are 
rather procyclical, particularly when a crisis has emerged. The budget balance weakened by nearly 6 percentage points 
within a few years when the crisis broke out at the beginning of the 1990s.  
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in a contractionary manner during the economic upswing in the 1980s and early 2000s. On the 
contrary, the indicator permits a fiscal policy that is more expansive than the actual fiscal policy, if 
it is calculated without the future development of the economy that would be available later. 
Besides, an output gap-based SB indicator ignores the fairly strong contractionary measures in 
fiscal policy implemented in the crisis in the early 1990s. 
It should be note that the real-time results presented are not without problems. Firstly, the real-
time estimate of the present output gap may underestimate the accuracy of the Commission´s 
estimate, as the Commission uses forecasts of the trend for future years to support the estimate. 
If the forecasts are informative regarding cyclical change, they can improve the model´s accuracy. 
On the other hand, revisions may have taken place in the data used which are not taken into 
account by ex post cutting of the data. It should also be noted that the assessment of the real-time 
gap does not take into account the effect of changes in other output gap components (such as 
participation). Likewise, I will not assess the amount of one-off items since the related evaluations 
are not available for the entire period in question. 
However, earlier literature would seem to indicate that there are no major differences between 
realised forecasts and quasi real-time assessments such as the one presented here. Kuusi (2014) 
compared quasi real-time output gaps with the Commission’s genuine real-time estimates, and 
the results achieved with the method did not significantly deviate from each other. The average 
difference in the output gap estimates was about 1/2 a percentage point in 2006–2012, which 
corresponds to about a 1/4 percentage point effect on the structural deficit. Virkola (2013) also 
examined the Commission´s revisions in respect of 2007 and observed that real ex post revisions 
to the output gap in Finland were on the same scale as the estimates currently shown, i.e. 
approximately 5 percentage points. Since the one-off measures are eliminated from both the 
output-gap based structural balance and the discretionary fiscal policy measures, they are not 
essential for comparison purposes.19 
                                                     
19 Koen and van den Noord (2005) show that the amount of one-off measures are likely to have been small during 1994-
2000, with the exception of the postponement of tax refunds in 1994 (1.3 pps of GDP). Financial restructuring in the 
banking sector can explain only a minor fraction of the abysmal deteriation  of public finances (-1.5 pps of GDP per 
annum in 1991-1992). In the 2000s, the one-off measures have been small according to the Ameco data. 
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Figure 3 Data and algorithms from the European Commission´s autumn 2014 forecast, and author’s own calculations. 
 
4.3. The bottom-up alternatives 
 
In Figure 4, I present assessments on the amount of discretionary fiscal efforts based on the 
bottom up method and the DFE indicator specified above. By applying the said method, an 
increase of one percentage point in the DFE indicator improves the structural balance by one 
percentage point. The cumulative change, on the other hand, indicates the total change in the 
budgetary position within a certain time period.  
I will focus here on assessments according to the bottom up method, as they do not use ex post 
data on the development of the economy. In that way, the presented method offers a real-time 
baseline for the SB. For comparison, the figure contains the real-time cyclically-adjusted balance 
and the non-adjusted balance presented in the previous subsection. As discussed before, both 
indicators are estimated without the information on the one-off measures. Figure 4 also shows the 
DFE indicator based on the expenditure aggregate, which is calculated based on the expenditure 
rule. The adjustment items for different types of expenditure have a relatively minor effect on the 
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resulting interpretation of fiscal policy developments. On the other hand, the differences between 
the assessments are almost fully attributable to the used inflation variables.20 
On the basis of Figure 4, a fiscal policy steered by discretionary measures could have become 
more countercyclical than a policy steered by SB. During the economic upswings in the 1980s and 
the 2000s, the fiscal policy is stimulative when measured using a discretionary assessment.21 This 
observation enables (1) the fiscal policy guided by the method to be tighter during the upswings 
(2) the control of the overheating of the economy and (3) creation of a margin for recovery 
measures during the crisis. In comparison, before the outbreak of each of the two major crises, the 
real-time structural balance based on the output gap method was exceptionally strong, which 
could have enabled the continuation of a stimulative fiscal policy during the upturns. 
On the other hand, the tightening of the fiscal policy after the outbreak of the crisis in the 1990s is 
clearly visible on the basis of the discretionary indicator. In particular, the significant tightening on 
the revenue side of social insurance contributions explains the strong increase in the discretionary 
indicator. After the outbreak of the crisis, the measured fiscal policy was tightened rapidly from 
1992 onwards and continued throughout the 1990s. The observation could have enabled the use 
of a more stimulative fiscal policy. When comparing the results to the development of the output 
gap-based structural balance (see Figure 3), we can see that, on the basis of the latter, the 
tightening of the fiscal policy did not begin until after the mid-1990s even as an ex post evaluation.  
                                                     
20 The inflation variables applied make the assessments somewhat cyclical, although the inflation projections used for 
the expenditure benchmark reduce the effect of inflation somewhat, particularly with regard to the end of the 1980s. 
Both indicators allow for strong growth in expenditure during periods of high inflation, while during crises and periods 
of low inflation the need may arise to make additional cuts in public expenditure. On the other hand, taking account of 
inflation adjustments in income tax rates as a change in the revenue basis has, to some extent, the opposite effect. 
21 Further decomposition of the indicator into revenue and expenditure components (𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑅 , 𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝐸) suggests that in the 
1980s the weakening of the fiscal position was due to increases in public expenditures, whereas in the 2000s it was due 
to both higher expenditures and lower revenues. 
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Figure 4 
Measured by both indicators, the fiscal policy was stimulative at the initial stage of the present 
crisis, but from 2011 onwards, the indicators diverge again as the discretionary fiscal effort 
indicator suggests a 2–3 percentage point tightening of the fiscal policy in 2010–2014, whereas the 
ex post structural balance indicator (in Figure 3) shows hardly any signs of improved public 
finances. 
In order to further illustrate the difference between the indicators in terms of cyclical behaviour, I 
have compared the ex-post changes in the output gap to the change in various fiscal policy 
indicators in 84–89, 89–93, 93–97, 97–00, 00–03, 03–07 and 07–09.22 Based on a cross-tabulation, 
a one percentage-point growth in the (ex post) output gap would have weakened the real-time 
structural balance by approximately 0.65 percentage points. Meanwhile, the bottom-up 
assessment method does not indicate a clear connection between the cyclical change and 
indicator developments. 
                                                     
22 The output gap is measured using the Commission’s method. 
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What explains the differences between the methods? First, similarly to the European Commission 
(2013B) and Carnot and de Castro (2015), I compare the developments in the structural balance 
net of interest expenses with the bottom-up method. After netting interest expenses, the 
differences between the indicators are more clearly attributable to methodological factors, such 
as different cyclical adjustments of revenue and expenditure items and a different method of 
calculating the potential output growth rate. The comparison between the real-time cyclically-
adjusted structural balance and the structural primary balance suggest that the interest expenses 
explain around 15 per cent of the cyclical changes in the real-time structural balance, while the 
rest is explained by methodological differences. 
Second, by means of changes in the revenue basis, the cyclical development of revenue items can 
be directly examined in different years, instead of using the output gap and fixed cyclical elasticity. 
I will do this by first eliminating the discretionary changes related to the various income types 
presented above (for methodological details, see, Kuusi 2015, appendix 4; Carnot and De Castro 
2015). In principle, the remaining element of income development can be evaluated as a (cyclical) 
change independent of fiscal policy, while naturally taking account of any errors in the effects of 
the related decisions. The results of the analysis suggest that changes in cyclical income in relation 
to cyclical income evaluated using the fixed elasticities may explain various percentage points of 
the differences in the changes in the structural balance according to the different indicators. In 
particular, the analysis of the late 1980s and early 2000s suggests that the income growth 
experienced during the economic upturn exceeded the estimates produced using the output gap 
method. In downturns, on the other hand, it appears that the differences are attributable to 
different cyclical adjustments of the unemployment expenditure and the different method of 
calculating the potential output growth rate. 
4.4. Indicator differences from the viewpoint of EU regulations  
 
I have also evaluated how the indicators would have steered the financial policy in practice if EU’s 
fiscal policy rules would have been followed during the period of time. I collect the observations in 
the previous analysis, and examine the regulatory requirements that the country would have 
faced in different time periods.  The rules are based on a summary of the criteria applied regarding 
deviations from the rules of the preventive and corrective arms of the SGP (European Commission 
2013A, 2016): 
– Deviation in the preventive arm: 
o The deviation from the medium-term objective (MTO)23, was more than 0.25 per cent of 
the GDP in the previous year (ex post assessment) and 
                                                     
23 The preventive arm of the SGP (applied when the 3 and 60 per cent deficit and debt criteria of the excessive deficit 
procedure criteria are not breached) uses the structural budgetary position and the increase in expenditure to assess 
deviations from the MTO or from the path towards it. The Fiscal Compact obliges the member states to set an MTO; as 
a result, this obligation is included in their national legislation. In the Fiscal Compact, the lower limit of the MTO for 
countries in the Eurozone was set to a budgetary position of -0.5 percent, except in the case of countries whose debt is 
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o the nominal deficit does not exceed 3 per cent, i.e. the country is not subject to the 
corrective arm of the SGP24 and 
o on the path towards the MTO, the structural balance improves by less than 0.5 percentage 
points and 
o the structural deviation from the path (ex post) is significant, i.e. at least 0.5 per cent of 
GDP and 
o the deviation is significant from the viewpoint of both the structural balance and the 
expenditure benchmark while taking account of the cyclical state in accordance with the 
guidelines of the European Commission (2015, appendix 2). 
– Deviation in the corrective arm: 
o The nominal deficit exceeds 3 per cent and 
o the measures are not effective, i.e. the country is unable to adjust its structural budgetary 
position by at least 0.5 percentage points (structural balance adjustment path) and 
o the structural deviation from the path (ex post) is significant, i.e. at least 0.5 percentage 
points per year and 
o the deviation is significant in terms of both the structural balance and the bottom-up 
assessment. 
 
The analysis shows that in many years during economic upturns (1985–1988, 2004–2005, and 
2007–2009)  Finland would have achieved the MTO based on the real-time structural balance, but 
at the same time would not have achieved the expenditure growth rate required by the 
expenditure benchmark, or would have been close to exceeding it. The major strengthening in the 
structural balance that preceded the crisis of the early 1990s and the current crisis could have 
allowed an expansion in the public finances. During both periods, the structural balance was 
rather strong as measured on the basis of both ex post and real time output gap estimates. At the 
same time, the expenditure benchmark might have imposed stricter limits on fiscal policy during 
the said years.   
Between the years 1993–1996, during which the legislation related to the corrective arm of the 
SGP could have been applied on the basis of the deficit criterion, Finland would not have reached 
the 0.5 percentage point adjustment requirement in the crisis years 1993 and 1995. Thus, Finland 
would have been unable to sufficiently adjust its structural deficit, and further measures might 
have been required.  However, following a careful consideration based on the bottom-up 
indicator, it can be seen that a sufficient adjustment of the general government balance was 
implemented in those years. 25 
4.5. Discussion of the results 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
less than 60% and which do not have long-term sustainability risks (in which case the lower limit is -1 per cent). In the 
following analysis, the MTO is set at -0.5 pps of GDP. 
24 Here, I abstract from the debt rule, as the debt level of the Finnish economy has remained below the 60% per GDP 
benchmark during the whole time period. 
25 In the present situation the differences between the indicators are smaller. An output gap-based structural balance 
would threaten to breach the limits of the EU’s fiscal policy rules, whereas according to of the expenditure benchmark, 
tightening in fiscal policy has been sufficient to compensate for the negative effect of downturn on the government 
finances. 
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All in all, the empirical analysis of the rules reinforces the impression of the limited capacity of the 
output gap method to predict cyclical changes in real time. On the other hand, the discretionary 
indicators can provide better guidance and steer fiscal policy more counter cyclically. In particular, 
it seems that the fiscal policy based on the expenditure rule would have been contractionary 
during the lead up to the 1990s crisis, which could have helped to alleviate the crisis and increase 
the margin for recovery measures after it started. On the other hand, based on a discretionary 
bottom up assessment, the contractionary fiscal policy practised from 1992 onwards would have 
been sufficient, and unlike the output gap-based SB, the method would not have generated 
additional contractionary pressures. 26 
The historical analysis raises several concerns regarding the use of the current output-gap 
methodology. It seems fair to say that explaining unemployment on the basis of inflation may be 
problematic, especially in the case of major economic crises, like the Finnish Great Depression of 
the 1990s. In particular, the findings are consistent with the recent literature suggesting that the 
behavior of inflation does not necessarily correspond to the New-Keynesian Phillips curve during 
major crises, even though it includes a delayed inflation term. Moreover, the output-gap revisions 
are not just due to methodological issues, but they reflect genuine real-time uncertainty regarding 
the measurement of potential output. The measured revisions during the Finnish Great 
Depression are large just as they have been large during the current crisis. 
While they seem to work better, the expenditure benchmark and bottom-up assessment are not 
fully immune to measurement problems either. They should also be buttressed by an 
understanding of the medium-term output potential of the economy. Although the moving 
average for past trends and forecasts over the business cycle is less sensitive to cyclical changes, 
short-term positions may also be reflected in longer-term assessments. Currently, this is a 
particularly important problem, as many countries are facing uncertainty regarding their long-term 
productivity prospects. Furthermore, independent economic analysis of the effects of various 
changes in policy is needed to back up the expenditure benchmark and the bottom-up approach. 
For example, any appraisals of the magnitude of the multiplier effect of fiscal policy – both during 
and outside crises – remain fairly contradictory. In terms of finding the neutral policy stance, the 
inflation variable of the expenditure benchmark and the bottom-up approach should be replaced 
with longer-term equilibrium inflation, in order to avoid changes in inflation or its forecasts having 
the effect of enhancing cyclicality. Both indicators allow for strong growth in expenditure during 
periods of high inflation, while during crises and periods of low inflation the need may arise to 
make additional cuts in public expenditure. 
                                                     
26 Based on the earlier literature it seems that the countercyclical steering of the fiscal policy may be beneficial also in 
terms of maximizing the magnitude of the positive multiplier effect of fiscal policy. Keränen and Kuusi (2016) 
estimates a regime-switching STVAR model by  using the Finnish data of the discussed time period. They show that the 
consolidation measures may slow the economic recovery especially at the turning point of the business cycle in the 
early 1990s, while during the economic upturns the multiplier effects may be small, or even negative.  
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Finally, based on the functioning of the historical behavior of the SB, it is problematic that the 
expenditure benchmark plays no clear role – independent of the structural balance and its 
calculation methods – in the EU´s fiscal rules.  In determining the medium-term growth reference 
rate of potential output in accordance with the expenditure benchmark, the preventive arm of the 
SGP still relies on the fulfilment of the MTO. In fiscal policy legislation, if the MTO has been 
achieved in a certain year, the reference growth rate of expenditure is the long-term GDP growth. 
On the other hand, if the MTO has not been achieved, expenditure growth measured using 
indicators must be slower so that the deficit decreases by at least 0.5 percentage points per 
year.27  This link is necessary, because the discretionary measures as such do not involve 
monitoring the objective level of fiscal policy, but only changes in fiscal policy. An alternative 
solution could involve tying the expenditure benchmark more closely to the debt level and to 
forecasts of its future trends based on sustainability calculations. Hughes Hallett and Jensen 
(2012), for example, propose a given limit for the indebtedness level below a GDP ratio of 60%, 
where exceeding such a limit would trigger preventive measures. Although the debt ratio is also 
sensitive to cyclical changes, it is not as prone to fluctuation as the (structural) deficit. On the 
other hand, we already have experience of cyclical adjustments of debt under the present rules. 
5. Conclusions 
 
The structural balance has played a central role in the EU’s new fiscal policy legislation. In this 
study, I examine estimates of the structural balance from a historical perspective, using the 
European Commission's analysis method and comparing it to alternative fiscal policy indicators. 
The perspective adopted is that of recent Finnish economic developments between the years 
1984-2014; a time period that includes the Finnish Great Depression of the 1990s. 
The results of the study corroborate the view presented in earlier literature, according to which a 
structural balance is difficult to estimate using the output gap approach. Although the European 
Commission uses the latest statistical methods to assess the cyclical state of the economy, 
measuring the output gap in real time proves to be a difficult task in practice. The capacity of the 
output gap method to filter out cyclical fluctuations and measure cyclical phase effects on the 
budgetary position is limited, which may result in an under- or overestimate of the structural 
budgetary position. Particularly in the overheating phase of the Finnish economy in the 1980s and 
also in the deep economic crisis of the early 1990s, using the structural balance to steer fiscal 
policy results in a very procyclical policy. 
The results also indicate that discretionary indicators (expenditure benchmark and bottom up 
assessment) form a useful part of the EU’s control of fiscal policy. On the basis of the analysis, 
fiscal policy based on the discretionary measures is more countercyclical compared to the policy 
                                                     
27 Furthermore, the measurement of the expenditure rule builds on the output gap-based assessments of cyclical 
unemployment. 
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that is guided by the output gap-based SB. Having said that, established ways of analysing the 
slackness in the economy with the help of inflation in particular should not be ignored, although 
methodological challenges have been encountered in applying them in practice. Long-term growth 
estimates calculated based on discretionary methods do not offer a clear reference point for 
assessing the cyclical position of the national economy. However, it is necessary to develop the 
output gap method in this respect in order to improve its reliability.  
Appendix: Parameter restrictions used when estimating the structural 
unemployment 
 
With respect to the application of the model (that is specified more closely below), I paid 
particular attention to the parameter constraints used when determining the model.  When 
considering the details of the model´s solution, it is observed that the parameter constraints 
concern the variance of cyclical variation (𝑉𝑐), which is restricted, bound by an assumption, to a 
value of 0.5. Likewise, the shock variance (𝑉𝑝) directly affecting the trend is restricted, in 
accordance with an assumption, to zero. Although the latter assumption is a natural variance 
positivity requirement, there are no clear statistical or theoretical grounds for the first 
assumption.  
 
The constrained parameter concerns the size of the variance of the cyclical component of 
unemployment in so far as the New Keynesian Phillips curve does not directly explain it. The 
smaller the parameter, the more the estimate on the size of cyclical unemployment is based on 
inflation changes. Hence, the effects of parameter constraint depend on the function of the 
Phillips curve. If wage inflation clearly reacts to growth in unemployment, the observed 
connection can be turned around, and unemployment growth can, for its part, be effectively 
determined based on inflation. The analysis suggests that the impact of the constraint is large. 
Furthermore, Kuusi (2015) shows that there are differences between countries in terms of the 
constraint’s size. 28 
 
Specification of the model 
 
                                                     
28 It is worth noticing that in assessing which model is superior, the European Commission also draws particular 
attention to a few technical details with respect to which there is no clear difference between the models. Firstly, the 
dependence between the unemployment gap and the cost variable should be significant.  This condition is fulfilled in 
both the unconstrained (the restriction is omitted) and the constrained model used by the Commission (let us denote 
them as models 1 and 2, respectively). In addition, the predicted cyclical component of unemployment should correlate 
negatively with the component explained by means of the inflation model in such a way that, within the model, the 
unemployment gap creates pressure to lower price levels. In both models, the correlation is negative (-0.58 in the model 
2). Moreover, the model´s coefficient of determination for changes in inflation should be as high as possible. In neither 
model (Model 1 used by the Commission nor the unconstrained model, 2) does the coefficient of determination rise 
very high. When inflation is explained based on the component predicted by the model, the coefficient of determination 
is R2 = 0.2 in the constrained model, 1, used by the Commission, whereas the coefficient of determination used in the 
unconstrained model, 2, is R2 = 0.16. Finally, in terms of the selection of the trend model assumption (equations 11 and 
12) in the case of the alternative model, 2, both autoregressive terms of trend pt are significant, confirming that the 
second order random walk is an appropriate assumption. 
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The functional forms and assumptions are the same as the assumptions concerning Finland in the 
forecast for autumn 2014. The first equation of the model is a regression model with structural 
time series error terms 
 
𝑢𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼1𝑖𝑧1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡
𝑀1
𝑖=1
,   (1) 
 
where z1.t are exogenous variables. The error term xt is a sum of the trend component pt and cyclic 
component ct so that 
 
 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡.    (2) 
 
The cyclical component is defined as the AR(1) model: 
 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝜙𝑐1𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑐𝑡,    (3) 
 
 
where act is a cyclical shock term with a variance of Vc. 
 
With regards to Finland, a trend shock is modelled in the reviewed Commission’s method as a 
second order random walk defined by the following equations 
 
𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 = 𝜇𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑝𝑡  
 
   (4) 
 
𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡−1 = 𝑎𝜇𝑡 
 
   (5) 
 
The equations apt contain a shock that affects trends directly and has a white noise distribution. Its 
variance is Vp. The second shock 𝑎𝜇𝑡   affects the slope of the trend and is also white noise. Its 
variance is marked as 𝑉𝜇. 
 
Another equation used in the method is the New-Keynesian Phillips curve that can be expressed 
concisely as: 
 
 
𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐶𝑡
𝑤 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐶𝑡−1
𝑤 + ψ0𝑐𝑡 + ψ1𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡, 
 
   (6) 
 
where RULCt is the rate of change or real unit labour costs, 𝑐𝑡  is the cyclical component of 
unemployment and 𝛼 is a term that includes various long-term relations (such as the average rate 
of the increase in productivity). 𝑒𝑡 is a noise term.   
 
The difference compared to the traditional method of estimating a Phillips curve lies in the 
assumption that the cyclical component ct cannot be perceived. Instead, the problem with a 
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statistical method of calculation is the assessment of unperceivable variables ptf ja ct using the 
maximum likelihood method and the so-called Kalman filter. A more detailed description of the 
method is presented by Planas and Rossi (2004), and Planas and Rossi (2014), These papers 
contain descriptions of the closed form solution for an estimator and of deriving the confidence 
intervals for forecast errors. 
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